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Articles
A Proposed Right of Conscience for
Government Attorneys
RALPH NADER* & ALAN HIRSCH**
Imagine a new attorney with a highly developed civic consciousness.
She dislikes the prospect of serving as a hired gun, because she does not
want to do work which violates her perception of the public interest. Is
she likely to choose private practice or government employment?
Paradoxically, this public-spirited attorney might well opt for private
employment, where "American lawyers have long claimed the right to
select clients in accordance with their conscience."' The American Bar
Association officially endorses this right.' In the private sector, a lawyer
can either work for herself, or in a partnership, and take on whatever
causes and clients she wants.3 Or she can work for a law firm which will
allow her to turn down assignments she finds distasteful.4 By contrast, if
* Ralph Nader is a consumer advocate and founder of several citizen organizations. In 1955 Mr.
Nader received an A.B. magna cum laude from Princeton University, and in 1958 he received a LL.B.
with distinction from Harvard University.
** Adjunct Professor, Williams College Legal Studies program. J.D. Yale Law School.
i. Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust
Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635,635 (1997).
2. The Comment to Rule 6.2 of the American Bar Association's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr [hereinafter MODEL RULES], which have been adopted, with some modification, by the bar
associations of forty states, declares that "[a] lawyer ordinarily is not obligated to accept a client whose
character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant." (The one partial exception, court appointments,
is discussed infra text accompanying notes 34-42.)
3. See L. Harold Levinson, "So You Want to Sue the President?" A Pre-Engagement Letter to a
Would-be Client, with Comments on a Law Firm's Freedom to Select Clients and Causes, 25 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 211, 248-49 (998) (noting that in America, unlike England, attorneys feel free to decline to
represent prospective clients); MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 66-70 (t990)
(noting that duty of zealous advocacy applies after an attorney has accepted a client, but does not re-
quire attorney to accept any particular client).
4. Although law firms are legally free to dismiss attorneys who decline a particular assignment,
as a practical matter consideration of law firm morale and profitability renders it unlikely that firms
will not accommodate a lawyer's claims of conscience. Firms can always find another lawyer to take on
a particular assignment, and do not wish to discourage or lose lawyers unnecessarily. See Levinson,
supra note 3, at 212 ("[A] law firm should respect and if possible accommodate the diverse opinions
and comfort levels of its members.").
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she opts for government employment, she forfeits any right of con-
science. She may lose her job if she declines an assignment.
This can happen even at the very top of the legal ladder, as illus-
trated by President Richard Nixon's dismissal of Attorney General Elliot
Richardson for refusing to fire the special Watergate prosecutor. This
example, while particularly infamous, is hardly the only instance of a
government attorney discharged for following his conscience.' And there
is no calculating how many others have compromised their consciences
for fear of discharge or other disciplinary action.
This Article argues for enactment of a statute or ethical canon pro-
tecting a government attorney's right of conscience.6 Part I discusses the
special role of the government attorney as articulated by courts and
commentators, and shows how in practice this conception is compro-
mised. Parts II, III, and IV discuss a range of circumstances in which
courts and legislatures protect the conscience of private attorneys, other
employees, and citizens generally, without creating havoc in the work-
place or society. Part V proposes a specific vehicle for extending such
protection to government attorneys.
For some reason, the conscience of the government attorney has
been neglected-in both theory and practice This Article proposes a
remedy for a problem that has been ignored for too long.8 Recognizing a
right of conscience of government attorneys would promote the pro-
5. See infra text accompanying notes 23-33.
6. There is some literature on the ethics of government attorneys, see, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot,
The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 (i99i), but it does not address a government attorney's obligation to
accept assignments that collide with his conscience.
7. See id. at 952-53 n.3 (noting that, in general, "government lawyers are the group whose ethical
responsibilities have been most neglected by scholars and the organized bar").
8. One commentator seemed primed to raise the issue. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government
Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1293 (1987). This short essay
pondered the hypothetical case of a Department of Education lawyer given a politically motivated
assignment that he regards as unconstitutional. However, Miller stacks the deck by considering
whether the attorney, having accepted the assignment, should take actions which undermine his
agency's position. This course he rightly rejects, noting that "[i]f attorneys could freely sabotage the
actions of their agencies out of a subjective sense of the public interest," an ineffective government
and distrustful public would result. Id. at 1295. See also Anthony Lewis, Government Lawyers and
Conscience, 59 A.B.A. J. 1420, 1421 (1973) (arguing that government "could not operate if every law-
yer employee took it upon himself to try to sabotage policies of which he disapproved"). However, the
notion that we should not authorize sabotage does not mean we should not protect conscience. Miller
notes in passing that the attorney "may have an easy out by requesting reassignment." Miller, supra at
1294. He fails to consider that this is not always an easy out, see infra text accompanying notes 23-33,
because a government attorney's right of conscience has not been acknowledged.
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fessed ideals of the legal profession and help attract able and public-
spirited attorneys to public service.9
I. THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY'S SPECIAL ROLE
It is a commonplace that the law is not a mere trade but a noble pro-
fession." Lawyers, as members of this inherently public and exalted pro-
fession," and officers of the court, are held to a higher standard than
members of other professions. 2 Within this select class, the government
attorney is held to the highest standard. 3 Unlike his counterpart in pri-
vate practice, he is often said to have the public interest as a client'4 and
is admonished to "put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to
country above loyalty to persons, party or Government department."' 5
The government attorney's special ethical responsibility is spelled
out most often in the context of the criminal law. As the United States
Supreme Court famously explained:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
9. We ought to encourage the attitude of the government lawyer who can say, "I am immensely
proud of the public service government lawyers perform." Douglas Letter, Lawyering and Judging on
Behalf of the United States: All I Ask for Is a Little Respect, 6I GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1993).
Such an attorney is surely justified in feeling that government lawyers are, as a group, "very different
from their private sector colleagues, who usually practice law as a profession and as a business enter-
prise." Id. Needless to say, there are exceptions-attorneys in the private sector who are as public-
spirited as the typical governmental attorney, and government attorneys who are basically bureau-
cratic time-servers.
in. See, e.g., Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 311 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[O]urs remains a noble profession.").
i i. The Preamble to the MODEL RULES declares that lawyers "play a vital role in the preservation
of society" and have "special responsibility for the quality of justice."
12. See, e.g., id. ("Lawyers also have obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of the
court.... [Olur duties go beyond what the law demands."); People ex rel. Karlin v. Clukin, 162 N.E.
487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C. J.) ("[Lawyers are] received into that ancient fellowship for some-
thing other than private gain. He became an officer of the court ... an instrument or agency to ad-
vance the ends of justice.").
13. See, e.g., United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1475 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[Wle normally as-
cribe a higher standard of professional and ethical responsibility" to government attorneys.); Freeport-
McMoran Oil Co. & Gas v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting the "remarkable asser-
tion at oral argument that government attorneys ought not be held to higher standards than attorneys
for private litigants"); United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, i 76 (6th Cir. 1986) ("United States At-
torneys are 'held to a higher standard of behavior' than other attorneys.") (quoting United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985)).
14. See Preamble to MODEL RULES (stating that government lawyers "may have authority to rep-
resent the 'public interest' in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so").
See also Elisa E. Ugarte, The Government Lawyer and the Common Good, 4o S. TEX. L. REV. 269, 270
n.3 (1999) ("[T]he goals of the representation of the government lawyer necessarily include pursuit of
the public interest."); Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[Government attor-
neys] have special responsibilities to both this court and the public at large.").
15. Ugarte, supra note 14 at 279 (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 13oo app. A (995)).
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case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.... It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful con-
viction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 6
This assessment has been frequently cited by the courts7 and has
"become ubiquitous on publications produced by and about U.S. Attor-
neys.
, ,8
All government attorneys are encouraged to think this way. Francis
Biddle, Solicitor General under Franklin Roosevelt, maintained that the
Solicitor General "is responsible neither to the man who appointed him
nor to his immediate superior in the hierarchy of administration.... [H]is
guide is only the ethic of his own profession framed in the ambience of
his experience and judgment."' 9 One commentator notes that "often this
perspective, to one degree or another, is held about the entire Depart-
ment of Justice."2 He further notes that United States Attorneys can be
thought of as agents of the law itself: "bound to carry out its meaning."2'
In light of the above, one might expect a government attorney to be
protected when she declines an assignment she perceives as illegal or im-
proper. Take the Supreme Court's insistence, quoted above, that prose-
cutors "refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction." Surely then, a prosecutor must decline a case when he con-
cludes that only improper methods can secure a conviction.2 And if pur-
suing such a case would violate his duty, surely he cannot be discharged
for refusing to do so.
That might be what we would hope and expect, but the reality is dif-
ferent. Take the case of Alan Hyatt. Hyatt was an assistant city attorney
in Minneapolis who refused to prosecute a case because he felt the police
lacked probable cause to make the search that produced the only evi-
dence. Accordingly, he felt "the case was not strong enough to win and
would have been tossed out of court by a judge."23 Hyatt was fired. The
I6. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (i935).
17. It has been cited almost 200 times by the federal courts alone.
I8. H.W. Perry Jr., Government Lawyering: United States Attorneys- Whom Shall They Serve?,
6I LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (1998).
19. FRANCIs BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).
20. Perry, supra note 18, at 130.
21. Id. See also Letter, supra note 9, at 1297 ("In theory, federal public servants have a single mas-
ter: the people of the United States.").
22. In a section dedicated to "Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors," Rule 3.8(a) of the MODEL
RULES does call upon prosecutors to "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is
not supported by probable cause."




discharge of this "popular and well-known attorney"24 was a hot topic of
conversation around the courthouse, with discussion "centered around
why an attorney with so much experience was not allowed to use his dis-
cretion in considering the outcome of a case."
2 5
That same question was raised by the discharge of David Bristow, a
"young rising star in the San Bernardino County district attorney's of-
fice."2 Bristow refused to prosecute a "three strikes and you're out"27
case that could have resulted in life imprisonment for a man charged with
possessing less than a quarter of a gram of cocaine. When Bristow could
not bring himself to try the case,28 he expected it would merely be "reas-
signed to an attorney who could prosecute it with conviction.'2 9 Instead,
he was fired.
Prosecutors are not the only government attorneys who can face the
choice between their conscience and their job. Just ask Ronald Ander-
sen, an EEOC attorney in Phoenix for nine years who, during his work
on a sexual harassment case, "uncovered a scheme to secure through
bribes the false testimony of government witnesses to be presented at
trial."3' After consulting both his conscience and the chair of the ethics
committee of the Arizona State Bar Association, Andersen felt he had
no choice but to prevent fraud on the court: He planned to advise the
court of the misconduct and withdraw from the case. However, his su-
pervisors forbade this course of action, and threatened retaliatory action
if he took it. Andersen went ahead and did the right thing, then resigned.
As his attorney explained: "Andersen was placed in the impossible situa-
tion of being [professionally] unethical as a lawyer or being insubordi-
nate as an employee.""3
These signal cases-that happened to make their way to the news-
papers or courtroom-are in fact only the tip of the iceberg: Numerous
government attorneys, in a variety of circumstances, face the same un-
tenable conflict. An Environmental Protection Agency lawyer may be
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Tom Gorman, Lawyer Fired Over "3 Strikes" Switches Sides, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at
A3.
27. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12 (a)-(d) (West 1999).
28. "It struck me as grotesque," he said. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Offi-
cials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 68 (i999) ("[G]overnment lawyers who de-
fend Bivens actions behave more like 'hired guns'... and less like public servants who would also take
into account the broader public interest .. "). A Bivens action is a lawsuit against a federal govern-
ment official for the violation of an individual's constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (I1971).
31. Andersen v. United States, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26681, at *4 (9th Cir. June 9, 1993).
32. Id. (brackets in original).
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asked to argue in court for an interpretation of a statute that he or she
believes contradicts the intent of Congress and promotes pollution. A
lawyer for the Federal Communications Commission might be asked to
defend a policy that limits access to the airwaves in a way she believes
contravenes the First Amendment. Or a lawyer at the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the Justice Department may be forced to take a position that
marks a retreat on civil rights. Government attorneys cannot expect their
views to trump those of their superiors. But must they be personally
forced take an assignment in violation of their conscience?33 As we shall
now see, sparing them this choice would merely accord them the respect
given private attorneys and other employees and citizens in assorted
situations.
II. THE PRIVATE ATrORNEY AND COURT APPOINTMENT
Private practitioners generally choose their own clients. There is one
ostensible exception: The American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct states that lawyers must accept court appointments
absent good cause for declining.34 However, good cause explicitly in-
cludes situations where "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the
lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the law-
yer's ability to represent the client."3
While the exception speaks in terms of harm to the client, courts
generally do not require that an attorney demonstrate such harm in order
to decline an appointment., 6 Thus, for example, in the context of a judi-
cial bypass of parental notification of abortion, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that a girl seeking a bypass
would have to approach an attorney who might have moral or religious
objections to abortion: "Presumably such an attorney would not accept
the representation... and we would certainly expect an attorney who
held such beliefs not to accept a court appointment."37
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Mallard v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa,38 an attorney refused a court ap-
pointment to represent an indigent litigant. The attorney argued that he
lacked trial experience and taking the case "would compel him to violate
33. Respecting their right of conscience would not mean giving each attorney within each agency
veto power over the decisions of the boss. If the boss disagrees with the subordinate's judgment, he
can reassign the case. The issue is only whether the attorney should enjoy veto power over assignments
by his superior that compromise his conscience.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 6.2 (1999).
35. Id. R. 6.2(c).
36. See Collett, supra note i, at 640. ("[Tlhe rule clearly continues to recognize that lawyers are
not ethically bound to accept every court appointment.").
37. Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1137 (7th Cir. 1983).
38. 490 U.S. 296, 299 (1989).
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his ethical obligation to take on only those cases he could handle compe-
tently. . . . "" The Court held that the attorney could not be compelled to
take the case, basing its decision on the fact that the federal statute em-
powers courts only to "request" an attorney's services.0 In this context,
the Court said something significant: "[S]omebody who frequently re-
fuses another person's requests might not win that person's favor. A sol-
dier who regularly fails to fulfill his superior's requests might not rise in
the ranks as rapidly as would someone who was more compliant."'"
This dicta suggests why protecting a government lawyer's right of
conscience would not destroy the effectiveness of government agencies
(just as the freedom of attorneys to decline particular assignments has
not destroyed the court appointment process). The government attorney
who frequently finds assignments morally unpalatable is probably work-
ing in the wrong place, and will presumably realize as much.
The fact that private attorneys may refuse court appointments sug-
gests the stark double standard between private and government attor-
neys. Whereas the private attorney can follow his conscience and decline
to represent a client in any case (i.e., even in the case of court appoint-
ment),42 the government attorney enjoys the right to decline an assign-
ment in no case.
The legal profession is so protective of a private attorney's con-
science that some courts and commentators oppose mandatory pro bono
programs because they constitute "a forced expression of belief (in the
",41value of pro bono causes) contrary to an individual's conscience....
This argument may seem a stretch," but it is taken seriously.45 It is time
39. Id. at 300.
40. 28 U.S.C. § i915(e)(i) (2ooo) ("The court may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel."). Similarly, most state statutes do not compel acceptance of an assignment.
41. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 301.
42. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Repre-
sent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 103o, 1039 (i995) ("[A] lawyer who believes that it
would be morally wrong to lend her professional skill to a particular cause ought not to be forced to do
so .... ").
43. Mary Coombs, Your Money or Your Life: A Modest Proposal for Mandatory Pro Bono Ser-
vices, 3 B.U. PUB. Irrr. L.J. 215, 222 (1993).
44. Coombs finds the argument "more imaginative than serious," id. at 223 n.2o, and we agree.
The case against mandatory pro bono is weak, because such programs leave lawyers free to decide
what cases to take. Theoretically a lawyer might object to the very concept of pro bono, but such a
view is entirely at odds with the ethos of the profession and the lawyer's status as an officer of the
court. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 6.i (t999) ("A lawyer should aspire to render at least
fifty (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.") and the accompanying comment ("Every
lawyer.., has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay.").
45. See, e.g., Greg Stevens, Note, Forcing Attorneys to Represent Indigent Civil Litigants: The
Problems and Some Proposals, i8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 770 (1985) (arguing against uncompen-
sated court appointments); David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty To Serve, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 735,765 (I98O) (noting that mandatory pro bono may "end up being antagonistic to the values
of some who are required to serve").
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to take seriously the far more persuasive case for accommodating a gov-
ernment attorney's right to refuse a particular assignment.
III. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
The case for recognizing a right of conscience for government attor-
neys draws support from various circumstances in which legislatures and
courts have directly or indirectly protected the consciences of employees.
A. THE WHISTLEBLOWER
The numerous federal and state statutes protecting whistleblowers
6
from retaliatory discharge provide a strong foundation for erecting a
right of conscience for government lawyers.47 On its face, the two situa-
tions may seem radically different: The whistleblower is discharged for
reporting wrongdoing, not for declining an assignment. On careful in-
spection, however, the situations are closely analogous.
The whistleblower statutes encourage certain behavior that serves
the public."' They also protect individuals' rights to conscience. In terms
of the latter, the rationale logically applies as much to attorneys faced
with an unpalatable assignment as to whistleblowers
The public policy question is more subtle. It obviously serves a pub-
lic purpose for whistleblowers to report wrongdoing, which they feel far
freer to do when given statutory protection. By contrast, it may be
thought that no public policy goals would be advanced by permitting
government lawyers to respect the dictates of their consciences. How-
ever, that is not the case. Declining an assignment makes a statement
that can have an impact. If, for example, the lead district attorney finds
that few of his attorneys will prosecute a "three strikes" case, he obtains
a valuable piece of information that ought to be shared with the legisla-
ture. Also, protecting the right of conscience would enhance morale
(above and beyond the fact that lawyers are unlikely to perform well on
assignments they oppose). Government lawyers would feel more like
46. See WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Vii
(Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972) (defining whistleblower as one "who, believing that the public interest
overrides the interest of the organization he serves, publicly 'blows the whistle' if the organization is
involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful activity").
47. For discussion of many such statutes, see David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or
Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & Emp. L.J. 109, 120-30 (1995).
48. See, e.g., Nichols v. Metro. Ctr. for Indep. Living, 50 F.3 d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The whis-
tleblower statute is intended to protect the public from unlawful employer conduct.").
49. See Mgmt. Info. Techs. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 151 F.R.D. 478, 481 (D.D.C. i993) (de-
scribing whistleblowers as "employees who speak out as a matter of conscience"); Chineson, Bureau-
crats with Conscience, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 50 (book review).
50. See Collett, supra note I, at 649 ("[T]he ideal of amoral lawyering disregards the damage in-
flicted to the moral integrity of lawyers who are forced to advocate immoral actions.").
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true public servants, not automatons." Finally, in the long term the per-
ception of public service can only be strengthened if government lawyers
enjoy a degree of discretion over their assignments rather than seeing
themselves as hired guns.52
Whistleblower statutes initially met much resistance on the ground
that they would promote disloyalty. 3 Some might make the identical ar-
gument against a right to conscience for government attorneys. In each
case, the premise is mistaken. To honor one's commitment to one's con-
science and the public interest is not to act disloyally. 4
Whistleblower statutes arguably encourage insubordination by em-
powering a disgruntled employee to make public accusations without
fear of adverse consequences.55 By analogy, the government lawyer might
falsely invoke the right of conscience to avoid assignments he deemed
too difficult or unrewarding. But, in each case, there's less to this risk
than meets the eye. The whistleblower risks being branded a trouble-
maker and looked upon askance. That serves as a strong deterrent to
frivolous whistleblowing, so that "when an employee decides to disclose
wrongdoing, the decision presumably is justified by the employee's sin-
cere belief that the public interest outweighs all other ethical and per-
sonal considerations."" The identical rationale logically applies to the
government attorney who resists an assignment.
So, too, protection of government whistleblowers was deemed a
threat to efficiency. 7 But our society came to recognize that the benefits
of protecting whistleblowers override that risk. In any case, the threat to
efficiency is far less when an attorney simply declines an assignment than
when an employee publicly challenges his superiors.
51. See Ugarte, supra note 14, at 276 ("It is only when lawyers recognize the duty to the common
good, as well as the duty to the agency, that they avoid the pitfall of simply being the mouthpiece of
the agency's administration.").
52. See Letter, supra note 9, at 1312 (government attorney seeking to "convey[] my pride in my
work as a public servant and [thus] inspire[] more attorneys to serve similarly").
53. See In re Frazier, I M.S.P.B. 163, i8o (I979) (noting that "Congress expressed great concern
that the whistleblower provisions not be abused by dissident employees who have no legitimate basis
for disclosures, but rather are bent upon disruption or upon creating smoke screens to obscure their
own wrongdoing.").
54. See Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25
wM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627,691 (1999) ("whistleblowing is usually a loyal rather than a disloyal act.");
Robert G. Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REv. 615,616 n.6 (1982) ("[Wjhistleblowers are often the most loyal employees.").
55- See In Re Frazier, i M.S.P.B. at 187 (expressing this concern).
56. Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts Provide a Shel-
ter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L.
REv. 316,317 (1993).
57. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the
Name of "Efficiency", 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 17 (1996).
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Whereas whistleblower statutes and case law protect activity in the
private as well as the public sector, several courts have recognized that
they are especially important and appropriate in the public sector, where
public service motivates participation and ought to guide conduct."
Likewise, the right of conscience is even more appropriate for govern-
ment lawyers than private lawyers.
B. THE "PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION" TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
The whistleblower statutes are part of a larger trend limiting the
power of employers to discharge employees without justification.
Most employees, including many government attorneys, are em-
ployed "at-will" -they have no specific statutory protection against
wrongful discharge. 9 Traditionally, an employer could discharge an at-
will employee for any reason (or no reason), and the employee would
have no recourse."° However, over the last few decades legislatures and
courts have moved in a different direction.' The whistleblower statutes
discussed above are only one example. Many legislatures proscribe dis-
charge based on various enumerated criteria 6' and many courts permit an
at-will employee to sue for wrongful discharge if the discharge is "con-
trary to a clear mandate of public policy."6 This doctrine has been used
to reverse discharges in various circumstances.64
58. See Lofgren, supra note 56, at 330-32 (citing and discussing cases providing greater protection
to public employees).
59. To be sure, federal government lawyers have certain procedural protections via the adminis-
trative law system. However, such protection is not available to many state and local government at-
torneys and offers only limited protection to federal government attorneys. See infra text
accompanying notes 89-93.
60. See G. Richard Schell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 445
n.64 (1993) ("[T]he traditional 'at will' employment contract, under which employees can be termi-
nated at the discretion of the employer, was once so favored by judicial notions of public policy that it
enjoyed constitutional status.").
61. See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Termi-
nate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, I88 (I98o) (discussing evolution of this trend).
62. See, e.g., Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE. ANN. § 1-2501 (1992) (prohibiting discharge based
on fifteen categories, including personal appearance, sexual orientation and political affiliation); FLA.
STAT. Ch. 440.205 (2002) (prohibiting discharge in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim).
63. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 9t8o) (seminal case discussing evolu-
tion of doctrine).
64. See, e.g., Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1988) (con-
cerning an employee discharged for refusing to sell liquor to intoxicated patron); Novosel v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983) (concerning an employee discharged for refusing to
participate in political lobbying); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876,880 (I11. 981) (con-
cerning an employee discharged for assisting law enforcement authorities in criminal investigation of
fellow employee); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149, i5o (N. J. Super. Ct. Law Div. I978) (concern-




Such protection springs from recognition that an employer's right to
discharge is "restricted by the rights of employees and society"' and
"[e]mployees should not be forced to choose between continuing em-
ployment and contravening public policy."6 A person's employment is
central to his "existence and dignity, 6 ' and ought not be lightly taken
away.
Some of the cases applying the public policy exception directly sup-
port the case for a government lawyer's right to conscience. For example,
in Kalman v. Grand Union Company," a pharmacist was discharged for
protesting an unlawful action by his manager. The court held that his
lawsuit could proceed because it alleged a discharge in violation of public
policy.69 Significantly, the court noted that the pharmacist's action was
motivated by "his perception of his professional obligations."'7
While some courts have been reluctant to extend the protection of
the public policy exception to attorneys, 7' at least one court recognized
that lawyers deserve special protection from wrongful discharge. In
Wieder v. Skala,72 a law firm associate informed the firm's partners of a
fellow-associate's perjurious conduct, and urged that the conduct be re-
ported to the appropriate disciplinary committee. When he persisted, the
firm discharged him, and he sued the firm for wrongful discharge. The
court held:
We agree with plaintiff that in any hiring of an attorney as an associate
to practice law with a firm there is implied an understanding so funda-
mental to the relationship and essential to its purpose as to require no
expression: that both the associate and the firm in conducting the prac-
tice will do so in accordance with the ethical standards of the profes-
sion.'
65. Cathyrn C. Dakin, Protecting Attorneys Against Wrongful Discharge: Extension of the Public
Policy Exception, 44 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1054 0995).
66. Id. at io44.
67. William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal
and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. REV. 885,892.
68. 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
69. Id. at 731.
70. Id. at 730.
71. These cases usually involve a claim of wrongful discharge by a client, and occasionally by in-
house counsel. See Dakin, supra note 65, at 1072-92 (1995) (discussing cases and arguing that public
policy exception should protect attorneys). See also Thomas A. Kuczadja, Self-Regulation, Socializa-
tion, and the Role of Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119, 138 (1998) (citing cases both apply-
ing and refusing to apply public policy exception to lawyers).
72. 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
73. Id. at iO8.
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Although the case took place in the private sector, there is no reason
to deny the same level of protection to government attorneys.74 Surely
neither they nor the government that employs them should be held to a
less exacting ethical standard. Rather, as noted, where the legal profes-
sion is concerned the government is generally held to a higher standard.75
To be sure, the attorney in Skala was not discharged for declining an
assignment based on conscience. And at least one court has held that a
professional's refusal to perform an assignment based on conscience and
professional responsibility does not warrant protection. However, that
oft-cited case, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,76 does not undercut
recognition of a right to conscience for government attorneys.
In Pierce, a physician was discharged for declining work on the con-
tinuing development of a controversial drug.77 She maintained that such
work would violate the Hippocratic Oath.78 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey rejected her claim for wrongful discharge based on the public pol-
icy exception, noting that "[a]n employee at will who refuses to work for
an employer in answer to a call of conscience should recognize that other
employees and their employer might heed a different call."'79 To permit
one employee to defeat the policy of the organization would create
"chaos."8
In the context of government attorneys, this analysis cuts the other
way. Precisely because other employees may heed a different call, a par-
ticular attorney's invocation of a right to conscience does not jeopardize
the implementation of the prescribed policy.s' What it does do is prevent
the unnecessary and dispiriting coercion of a public-spirited profes-
sional."
Some courts have applied the public policy exception where an em-
ployee was fired for refusing to violate the United States Constitution or
74. Needless to say, no attorney has a right to government employment. See Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 360 (976) ("[T]here is no right to a government benefit, such as public employment."). This
is really another way of saying that government employees are at-will employees.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 13-21.
76. 417 A.2d 505 (198o).
77. The drug, loperamide, designed to treat diarrhea in infants, children, and elderly persons, con-
tains saccharin. In light of potential harmful effects of saccharin, the physician believed it immoral to
test the drug on children, especially since alternative drugs might soon be available. Id. at 506--07.
78. Id. at 505.
79. Id. at 514.
80. See id.
8I. By contrast, the discharged employee in Pierce was "the only medical doctor on [the] project
team." 417 A.2d at 506. The research in question would have ceased if the physician did not work on it,
and "chaos would result if a single doctor engaged in research were allowed to determine, according to
his or her individual conscience, whether a project should continue." Id. at 514.
82. Needless to say, the situation is somewhat different in the rare circumstance where a govern-
ment lawyer is the only lawyer on staff capable of handling a particular matter.
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a state constitution."' This application is particularly germane to the gov-
ernment attorney, who takes an oath to uphold the Constitution.84 That
oath suggests that one's ultimate loyalty is to the Constitution. 85 One
should not be forced either to violate such an oath or to lose his em-
ployment. 6
It does not follow that every intra-agency dispute over the Constitu-
tion will or should end up in the courts. Rather, in the case of the gov-
ernment attorney given an assignment he or she regards as
unconstitutional, a much easier solution presents itself: reassignment of
the case to an attorney who can take it without consciously violating his
oath and conscience.
Under current law, federal government attorneys do receive a de-
gree of procedural protection from wrongful discharge. As "Schedule A"
employees, they may protest a discharge to the Merit System Protection
Board (MSPB).R7 However, the availability of this administrative option
is currently of no consequence for the government attorney discharged
because he followed his conscience and declined to follow orders: With-
out a rule or norm protecting an attorney's right of conscience, the
MSPB will not find in his favor. 8 Under current law, discharging an em-
ployee who follows his conscience is considered justified: Unless the em-
ployee can show that the action he refused to undertake was blatantly
improper, his act will be viewed as insubordination. Since these situations
involve judgment calls, and the government body is accorded Ereat def-
erence by the MSPB, the protection afforded is minimal at best.
Likewise, internal protections afforded within certain government
agencies are of limited utility. While agencies are bound by their internal
83. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
85. See James R. Harvey, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Repre-
sentation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1615 n.309 (1996) (noting that "[m]ost gov-
ernment officials are required to pledge their oath to support and defend the Constitution, not the
president" or one's other superiors).
86. Indeed, forcing such a choice could run afoul of the doctrine that government cannot place
"unconstitutional conditions" on employment. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public
Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement. 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, II13-15 (1988)
(discussing cases applying this doctrine).
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2002); 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d).
88. See Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 46o-6I (7th Cir. i99I) (upholding discharge of
FBI employee for "religiously motivated refusal to accept a single assignment" because the MSPB
"accept[ed] the FBI's view," that tolerating such refusals, rooted in sincere religious belief, would
"contribute to a breakdown in discipline" and "hinder the efficient operation of the FBI").
89. See Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3 d 103, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The MSPB reviews federal em-
ployer disciplinary actions deferentially... [aind we review the MSPB's assessment deferentially.");
Curran v. Dep't of Treasury, 714 F.2d 9 13 , 9 14 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that agency must show only that
its adverse action promotes efficiency of the service (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(c), 7513(a)) and "a ra-
tional nexus between the adverse action and the agency's articulated reason for the action").
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provisions,' such provisions do not prohibit discharge of attorneys who
decline an assignment that violates their conscience.'
In short, government attorneys need a new substantive protection-
an acknowledged right to decline an assignment that violates their con-
science. Such a right would dovetail with the "public policy" exception to
at-will employment.
C. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S FREE SPEECH RIGHT
The Supreme Court provides protection to public employees dis-
charged for exercising their First Amendment right to free speech." The
Court recognizes that allowing public employees to voice their views can
compromise "the efficiency of the public services"'93 performed by the
government, but has held that the value of free speech about matters of
public concern can trump this consideration.94
Significantly, some commentators have criticized the Court for root-
ing the protection solely in the value to the public of discussion of mat-
ters of public concern, and ignoring another First Amendment value
celebrated in other contexts: individual self-development or self-
realization.95 As one commentator cogently argues, "the ultimate goal of
government in rendering [] public services is to further individual mem-
bers of the public in their pursuit of self-fulfillment. It is unthinkable that
the government, in its status as a public employer, should ignore the simi-
lar interests of its own employees.
' 96
The imposition on the government lawyer forced to take an assign-
ment that violates his conscience is even greater than the imposition on
the public employee forced to keep quiet. The former is in the unique
9o. See Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d lO92, to98 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Courts, of course,
have long required agencies to abide by internal, procedural regulations concerning the dismissal of
employees even when those regulations provide more protection than the Constitution or relevant
civil service laws.").
91. See WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 46, at i9 ("Civil servants should be given more substantive
rights .... Under the present civil service regime, the few rights that employees have are 'procedural':
They have a right not to be fired without some sort of appeal, but once into the appellate process
management can defend virtually any action on the grounds that it was 'in the interest of the service.'
And management's own view of the interest of the service is not subject to serious challenge.") (em-
phasis added).
92. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
93. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
94. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
95. See, e.g., Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 121,
127-28 (1996); Lee, supra note 86, at 112I; Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector
Employment: The Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597,
599 (1986).
96. Ma, supra note 95, at 128.
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position of actively assisting a cause he believes unjust. That position is
difficult for anyone, and all the more unfortunate when imposed on
someone who sees public service as her calling.
D. THE MEDICAL "CONSCIENCE CLAUSE"
Many states have long had "conscience clauses" stipulating that phy-
sicians may suffer no penalty when they refuse to perform abortions.9"
After the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion,0
the United States Congress also enacted such a law.'
States have extended similar protection to doctors in other situa-
tions, such as physician-assisted suicide," and to other health care pro-
fessionals as well.' These conscience clauses derive from recognition
that there are "professionals who have not only professional ethical obli-
gations but personal moral convictions that may be implicated by their
professional duties" and each "should be entitled to have his or her per-
sonal scruples respected to the extent that is reasonably practical .... A
number of commentators have called for expanding such protection to
various health care professionals."
For reasons discussed above, government lawyers should be among
the first, not the last, professionals to receive such protection.
E. THE GERMAN APPROACH
It may be thought that, in providing the various protections dis-
cussed above, American courts and legislatures have shown themselves
extraordinarily solicitous of the conscience of employees. In fact, the pro-
tection is slim compared with that provided in Germany.
97. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (1999) ("[Any person who states in writing an objection
to any abortion or all abortions on moral or religious grounds shall not be required to participate in
procedures which will result in such abortion; and the refusal of the person to participate therein shall
not form the basis of any claim for damages on account of such refusal or for any disciplinary or re-
criminatory action against the person.").
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (973).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3ooa-7 (1974).
soo. For example, Oregon's Death With Dignity Act stipulates that a health care provider cannot
be punished for refusing to participate in physician-assisted suicide. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.885
(Supp. 1998).
loI. See William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the Phar-
macists Right of Conscience, 5 OHio N.U. J. PHARMACY & L. 1, I6 (1996) ("Conscience clauses have
been a way to implement a zone of protection for those whose substantive moral beliefs have rendered
them incapable of participating in certain therapeutic services.").
102. Id.
io3. See, e.g., id. at 2 (arguing that because pharmacists are health care providers sometimes placed
in a morally difficult position, we need "assurance that the pharmacist's right of individual conscience
is appropriately recognized"); Irene P. Loftus, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical Per-
sonnel Confronting the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 718 (I990) (calling for "more sub-
stantially certain protection for medical personnel who could not in good conscience participate in
withdrawing nutrition and hydration" from patients).
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The German Constitution contains a provision providing for free-
dom of conscience, °4 which has been construed to permit all employees
to decline to perform a task they deem incompatible with their con-
science. 15 The determination is left to the employee, who may not be dis-
charged on account of its exercise."'
While this broad right of conscience can pose difficulties of imple-
mentation,"° it has hardly wreaked havoc on Germany's economy or so-
ciety."
IV. CONSCIENCE-PROTECTION OUTSIDE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Legislatures and courts have protected the right of conscience in ar-
eas outside the employment context that provide additional support for
an analogous right for government attorneys.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST COERCED EXPRESSION
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment prevents the
government from forcing individuals to articulate or promote viewpoints
with which they disagree. The paradigmatic cases are West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette"° and Wooley v. Maynard."' In Barnette
and Maynard, respectively, the Court struck down a statute requiring a
compulsory flag salute and a statute requiring compulsory display of the
state motto ("Live Free or Die") on license plates. These cases sought to
protect "the sphere of intellect and spirit ..... and "freedom of mind ....
Some commentators characterize the protected right as one of "person-
hood""' 3 or "self-realization."" 4 Perhaps most tellingly, Chief Justice
104. Art. 4 GG.
1O5. See Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights: Introduction and Overview, 17 CoMp. LAB. L.J.
1, 5-6 (1995).
io6. See id.
107. See Manfred Weiss & Barbara Geck, Worker Privacy in Germany, 17 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 75, 80
(1995) (noting that German courts have wrestled with "whether a distinction can be made between a
'reasonable conscience,' which would justify a refusal to perform certain work, and an 'unreasonable
conscience,' which would be deemed irrelevant.").
lO8. It is obvious why Germany is especially protective of a right to conscience-in light of that
country's history, the notion that one must follow all orders has a nasty resonance. But in America,
too, blind obedience to government superiors merits a degree of scorn. See, e.g., Jaffe v. U.S., 663 F.2d
1226, 1250 (3 d Cir. I98i) (en banc) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (referring mockingly to the idea of "en-
couraging unquestioned obedience" in the military context-where obedience is expected more than
anywhere-as the "serviceman as automaton principle").
109. 319 U.S. 624 (943).
110. 430 U.S. 705 0977).
III. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; Maynard, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
112. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637; Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
113. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15.I-.5, at 886-900 (1978).
114. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
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Rehnquist rightly characterized these cases as protecting "the constitu-
tional interest of natural persons in freedom of conscience..''.5
Why not extend such protection to the government attorney asked
to take a position which violates his or her conscience? Being forced to
utter or display certain words is much less far-reaching than being forced
to use one's professional skills to argue a case or otherwise take a posi-
tion that can have a major impact on public policy. Whose conscience is
compromised more-the private citizen forced to display a "Live Free or
Die" message to which he objects or the government lawyer forced to ar-
gue in court a position he believes detrimental or even unconstitutional?
The latter is in a position where his own professional success can produce
a result he believes harmful to the public interest.
One might respond that the government employee can escape this
burden merely by taking another job. However, the defendant in
Barnette could have attended a private school and the defendant in May-
nard could have moved to another state." 6 The question is not whether
the compulsory activity can be escaped. The question is whether we
deem it proper to put a person in the position of leaving his job or violat-
ing his conscience."7 Absent some compelling reason, the answer is a re-
sounding no.
B. THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
Another place where our society has shown sensitivity to the right of
conscience is in exempting from military service those who conscien-
tiously object. I, 8 Federal law traditionally exempted from combat those
who "by reason of religious training and belief [are] conscientiously op-
posed to participation in war......
The statute defined religious belief as belief "in relation to a Su-
preme Being" and "does not include essentially political, sociological, or
115. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n. of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 32 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
I16. Indeed, in dissent in Barnette, Justice Frankfurter emphasized that anyone objecting to the
compulsory pledge of allegiance could attend private school. See 319 U.S. at 656-58 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The majority was unmoved by the argument.
117. Nor can Barnette and Maynard be distinguished on the ground that these cases dealt with
speech. The government attorney forced to take a certain position will, inevitably, be forced to verbal-
ize that position-in court papers and at oral argument.
118. See Spencer E. Davis, Jr., Comment, Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace? The Status of
Conscientious Objection Exemptions, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191, 192 (1991) ("[E]xemptions, in one
form or another, for conscientious objectors have been included in every federal statutory scheme au-
thorizing compulsory military service in the United States since the Civil War.").
119. 50 U.S.C. app. § 45 6 (j) (2000).
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philosophical views or a merely personal code ..... However, in cases that
arose during the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court essentially broadened
the statute to encompass non-religious conscientious objection."' Seeking
to avoid Establishment Clause problems, the Court reversed the convic-
tions of conscientious objectors who explicitly disavowed belief in a Su-
preme Being. Through interpretive acrobatics, the Court in United States
v. Seeger read "religious" belief to encompass any "sincere and meaning-
ful belief which occupies in [the objector's] life ... a place parallel to that
filled by [] God" in the life of religious objectors.2 '
In Welsh v. United States, Justice Harlan in concurrence and Justice
White in dissent pointed out that the Seeger Court was playing games. As
White observed, despite a tortured disclaimer the Court contradicted the
statute's prohibition on draft exemptions based on "philosophy, history,
and sociology.' '23 Justice Harlan agreed, but he argued that the Court
could have upheld the statute anyway, by rejecting any reference to relig-
ion: "The common denominator must be the intensity of moral convic-
tion with which a belief is held," even if it is "guided [only] by personal
ethical considerations.' ' .4 Such an approach, Harlan noted, accords with
our country's "recognition to what is in a diverse and 'open' society, the
important value of reconciling individuality of belief with practical exi-
gencies whenever possible.'2 5
The two-word qualification at the end is important-our society can-
not be sustained if we exempt from the requirements of law anyone with
a strong moral objection to a law. '26 At the same time, when someone's
strong moral views demand withholding her personal participation in a
government activity, and harm no one else, we should honor it "when-
ever possible." There is no reason to limit this principle to combat: Other
activities violate a person's deeply held beliefs. A society committed to
individual rights should honor such beliefs absent a significant interest in
compelling compliance.'2 7
120. Id. The statute has been amended to strike out any reference to a supreme being, Pub. L. 90-
40, § 1(7) (1967), but that was not the case when the Supreme Court addressed it in United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), discussed infra text accompanying notes 123-24.
121. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
122. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
123. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 367 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 358-59.
125. Id. at 365-66.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("The tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious belief."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (permitting
citizens to disobey all laws that violate their conscience would "in effect [be] to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself").
127. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that governmental actions that substantially burden a reli-
gious practice must be justified by a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374
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Where the government lawyer wishes to avoid an assignment that
clashes with his or her conception of public service, both sides of the
equation-the individual interest and the state interest-counsel in favor
of permitting his resistance. Professionals who answer the call of public
service are the last people who should be forced to violate their concep-
tion of the public good. Why should we force them to do something they
believe immoral more than we would a reluctant soldier who has not
shown any particular commitment to the public interest?
Moreover, the state interest in requiring every government lawyer to
accept every assignment is slight. Whereas there is some risk that war-
time conscientious objector status will be abused, the likelihood of abuse
of a government lawyer's right of conscience is comparatively tiny. After
all, for obvious reasons many people want no part of military service. By
contrast, the government attorney does want to represent the govern-
ment. We strengthen our commitment to our ideals if we honor his or her
conscience on those occasions when it would be compromised by a par-
ticular assignment.
V. A MODEST PROPOSAL
As the above should make clear, protecting a government attorney's
right of conscience would not involve creation of a new theory of enti-
tlement. It merely seeks to extend a time-honored right to a most deserv-
ing group: those who opt for a career of public service within a noble
profession.
The proposed right should be explicitly protected by statute. That
would provide the maximum protection for government lawyers. But the
legal profession need not await a statute. Rather, the American Bar As-
sociation and state bar associations can adopt an appropriate canon of
ethics. ,8 If such a canon existed, superiors would be more respectful of
attorneys who declined an assignment and courts might provide recourse
where such respect was lacking."9 Courts may well find it unreasonable
U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (i99o), which upheld a state
statute banning peyote, the Court seemed to pull back from that position. However, the Court's rejec-
tion of the "compelling governmental interest" test was limited to statutes imposing "an across-the-
board criminal prohibition on a particular from of conduct." Id. at 884. The disruption to society from
conscience-based exemptions from the criminal law is obviously far greater than a government law-
yer's conscience-based exemption to a particular assignment.
128. See Ugarte, supra note 14, at 273 ("[N]either the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), nor the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) are very helpful. To
the extent that either set of rules addresses the government lawyer at all, only vague guidance is of-
fered.").
129. See Dakin, supra note 65, at io62 n.104 (summarizing cases that hold ethical codes can some-
times establish public policy).
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for the government to discharge a public servant for adhering to the ex-
plicit ethic of her profession.'30
The canon of ethics should be drafted in a way that does not give
every attorney veto power over every assignment.'3 ' The following pro-
posed language might fit the bill: "A government lawyer may decline an
assignment if he believes it will force him to act unlawfully or otherwise
violate his oath of office or conscience."
It is highly doubtful that such a canon of ethics would significantly
impede government efficiency. The proposed language sets the bar for
declining an assignment reasonably high, and, as we have seen in the
various other areas where an employee's or citizen's conscience is pro-
tected, there is a built-in disincentive to claim such a right too casually.
Any fear that the proposed right of conscience would be abused, and
the government significantly disrupted, should be alleviated by the vari-
ous analogies canvassed above. Germany has not suffered because all
employees have a right of conscience,'32 just as America has not suffered
because of respect for the conscience of citizens in assorted situations.
The advantages of the proposed right of conscience should be clear.
Then-Chief Justice Burger lamented that the notion of lawyers as officers
of the court, "a significant feature of the lawyer's role in the common
law.., has sustained some erosion over the years at the hands of cynics
who view the lawyer much as the 'hired gun' of the Old West."'33 But, ac-
cording to the Chief Justice, "the overwhelming proportion of the legal
profession rejects [this] denigrated role of the advocate... .""' Instead,
he argued, the "very independence of the lawyer ... is what makes law a
profession, something apart from trades and vocations in which obliga-
tions of duty and conscience play a lesser part." '
The Chief Justice was referring to the attorney in private practice.
There is no reason a government lawyer should be more of a hired gun,
and have less of an obligation of duty and conscience than an attorney in
private practice. One would expect the opposite. And the proposed right
of conscience would enhance the utility to society of government attor-
I30. The importance of such a canon of ethics is illustrated by Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (I98O), discussed supra text accompanying notes 76-80. In upholding the dis-
charge of a physician who refused to participate in research she considered unethical, the court noted
that the physician failed to show that she acted in accordance with "the principles of ethics of the
American Medical Association." Id. at 508.
131. See Ugarte, supra note 14, at 278-79 ("At the very least, serious consideration should be given
to crafting rules of professional responsibility that provide more guidance to those who have chosen
government employment over the private sector.").
132. See supra note to8.
133. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 731 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).




neys both by reminding them of their paramount obligation to serve the
public interest and by liberating them to do so in more situations.
Another Supreme Court Justice, Hugo L. Black, opined that "[t]o
force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving,
government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it. ' ,' 36 It is
worse still to create government-fearing automatons out of those mem-
bers of the bar who choose public service.'37
CONCLUSION
Our society has shown sensitivity to the call of individual conscience.
We respect the conscience of draftees who oppose war, physicians who
oppose abortion, employees who oppose their superiors' misconduct, and
citizens who oppose government dogma (e.g., on license plates and in the
classroom). It is time to respect the conscience of those officers of the
court in the forefront of the fight to protect the rights of the rest of us.
136. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 1I5-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
137. In the words of Harvard law professor and Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox,
"[tihe lawyer is not always right about what conscience or a sense of public responsibility require. On
the other hand, he will soon lose both his independence and his influence if he is always ready to de-
vote his skill and legal knowledge to any enterprise not involving crime." Address before the Section
of Tort and Insurance Practice of the American Bar Association (ABA) at the ABA's Annual Con-
vention in Atlanta (July 3I, 1983), LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1983, at 6.
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